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NON-MARKET VALUATION AND THE HOUSEHOLD
V. Kerry Smith and George Van Houtven*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Non-market valuation has largely ignored the collective nature of household decision
making.1  Over the past two decades labor economists have considered co-operative and non-
cooperative models for household behavior, especially as they influence labor supply
decisions.2  This paper describes how the collective model of household behavior transforms
the interpretation given to the methods used to measure the economic values of environmental
resources.  Both revealed and stated preference methods are affected.  These conclusions
follow from using Chiappori's [1988, 1992] collective model for household behavior to re-
interpret how individual choices relate to consumer surplus measures.3
Generalizations to the way we describe household behavior and define benefit measures
are warranted for several reasons.  Most adults live within households.  Their labor/leisure
choices are conditioned by the presence of other adults and children.4  Many of the measures
                                               
* The authors are, respectively: Arts and Sciences Professor of Environmental Economics, Duke University and
Resources for the Future University Fellow; and Senior Economist Center for Economics Research, Research
Triangle Institute.  An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1998 annual meetings of the Association of
Environmental and Resource Economists, the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, and the NSF/EPA Conference
on Decision-Making and Valuation for Environmental Policy.  Thanks are due participants in the workshops, as
well as Cheryl Doss and John Horowitz for comments on it; Martin Heintzelman and John Sena for most capable
research assistance; and to Kris McGee and Kelly DeMarchis for preparing several different drafts of this
manuscript.  Partial support for this research was provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under
grant #R825308-01-0.
1 Quiggin's [1998] recent analysis of the implications of different definitions of altruism for individual and
household willingness to pay is the only paper we could find specifically addressing these issues.  His focus, in
contrast to ours, is on contingent valuation and in comparing different conceptions of altruism within a unitary
model.  See Smith and Van Houtven [1998a] for a more detailed discussion of the contrasts between his
approach and the one developed here.
2 A good general overview of the issues is in Lundberg and Pollak [1996].  Bergstrom [1997] provides a
somewhat more technical summary.  Both reviews do not consider in detail the differences between alternative
versions of the collective model.  Recent papers by Apps and Rees [1997] and Chiappori [1997] have
highlighted their respective differences.
3 One aspect of these differences relates directly to the Hanemann-Morey [1992] discussion of partial and
complete compensating variation measures.  However, the results here are in principle stronger than what their
analysis would imply.  This follows because the Chiappori framework imposes a stronger separability condition
(i.e. the household objective function is equivalent to additive separability) whereas Hanemann and Morey
consider only weak separability.
4 Kooreman and Kapteyn (K-K) [1987] provide one of the most detailed treatments of time spent in non-market
activities for both husbands and wives.  Their findings clearly suggest each partner's work/leisure allocations are
affected by each person's own circumstances and that of their spouse.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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used to estimate the economic value of improvements in environmental quality derive from
the decisions people make in allocating their leisure time.  Thus, it should not be surprising to
find that the factors influencing intra-household decisions affecting work would also be
important to the non-market valuation of environmental resources.  Environmental pollutants
also affect human health.  These effects are usually described using models linking measures
of morbidity and premature mortality to the exposures people have to those pollutants.
Households adjust to health shocks by transferring money and time to their sick members,
attempting to maintain their well-being (see Lillard and Weiss [1997] as one example).  A
framework that focuses exclusively on each individual would ignore how household
mitigation can reduce individual losses due to pollution.
More generally, the household is an institution organizing its members' activities.
Decisions about what is treated as the primitive consumption unit for the purpose of analysis--
whether individual or household--influence the concept of Pareto efficiency.5  This is not an
issue for Becker's [1974] unitary model or Chiappori's [1988] collective model because both
specifications imply an efficient allocation of resources within the household.  Rather, it is
one that can arise in a wide class of the bargaining models for households.6
                                               
5 This is actually part of a larger question.  Within the economic framework used to define Pareto efficiency,
children are not economic agents assumed to be capable of independent choices that serve their best interests.  By
adopting the Becker framework where we assume there is one altruist who takes account household members'
well-being we avoid the problem.  Once the collective model is adopted, it is reasonable to ask whether some
households act to assure efficient allocations from society's perspective.  Hamilton [1998] implicitly raises this
question in considering the effects of violence on television for young children.  He asks whether parent's efforts
to acquire information and monitor behavior are consistent with an efficient response, given we "accept"
empirical evidence that violent programming promotes violent behavior.  Similar questions could be raised with
second hand tobacco smoke, exposure to hazardous substances in drinking water or indoor air.  Children's
exposure time and responses may be greater than adults.
6 Within the McElroy - Horney [1981] Nash bargained external or the Lundberg - Pollak [1993] internal threat
point models, a Pareto efficient allocation (from the individual perspective) is not assured.  In the static Nash
bargaining models, the difficulties arise because of the interpretation given to the objectives of individual
household members in relation to the bargained outcome.  If we consider the bargaining model's objective
function as a description of the negotiation process (rather than the objectives of the household), there are no
specific problems posed with defining welfare concepts.  To see this point consider the model with external
threat point.  The household is viewed as maximizing the gains realized over an alternative, exogenous default
state subject to its budget constraints.  If we treat U
1(·) and U
2(·) as to the two members' utility functions and T
1,
T
2 as the utility they would have realized outside of the "marriage" (or the household relationship), then we can
describe the household's objective function with the equation given below.
Max ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) U T U T
1 1 2 2 ￿ - ￿ -  
With this specification an important source of the economic gains to forming a household is the ability to share
expenses on household public goods.  This bargaining model can pose questions for applied welfare analysis.
This depends on how we interpret the Hicksian surplus measures that can be derived from it.  That is, we must
consider whether the welfare measures are defined conditional to a bargained outcome for each individual (using
individual preferences and reflecting the role of how bargaining outcomes change with the policy) or as a
composite value to the household objective function.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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The collective model also identifies another potential source of nonuse or passive use
values.  It is not based on altruism.  Rather it results from a reallocation of non-wage income
within the household.  This change stems from an increase in a non-market environmental
resource that provides use value for one household member but not the other.  The
reallocation may increase the other resources available to the nonuser.
Section II outlines the basic features of the "new" household models.  It uses simple
examples to describe how exogenous (to the household) changes in the provision of public
goods or environmental risks can be analyzed in a collective model.  Section III considers
what the framework implies for environmental valuation, and the last describes some next
steps in judging whether the collective model would be supported by empirical record.
II.   MODELING A HOUSEHOLD FOR BENEFIT MEASUREMENT
Choices made within a household context can be made through some type of
collective evaluation.  There is nothing in the conventional model of consumer choice that
precludes having an individual's response reflect links between household members.
However, any "sorting out" of the elements in this process requires prior restrictions sufficient
to permit one to describe how choices made in a household context are related to individual
preferences.  The collective model focuses on this issue by assuming that some rule for
distributing power or income within the household is established prior to making consumption
and labor supply choices.  To illustrate the importance of these assumptions we begin with the
unitary model.
A.   Background
The most common framework in conventional demand theory treats the terms
"household" and "individual" synonymously.  A household is a collection of individuals that
behaves as if they agreed on the best way to combine their time, incomes, and home production
activities.  Sometimes labeled the "unitary model", this approach implies income pooling (i.e.,
re-distribution of income within the household will have no effect on expenditure patterns).
Several explanations for the unitary model have been offered, ranging from Samuelson's
[1956] early consensus based explanation to Becker's [1974] "rotten kid theorem".7
By contrast, the "collective model" assumes the household is Pareto efficient subject
to a pre-defined income allocation rule for how the non-wage income is distributed among
members of the household (usually the husband and wife).  The income sharing rule is a
modeling device used to take into account the role of each member's preference for the
observed consumption choices.  The rule recognizes that the observed choices of each
member depend on how disposable incomes are divided.  Chiappori's [1988, 1992] model
                                               
7 The Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales [1997] test of the income sharing hypothesis is one of the most widely cited
test of the unitary model.  It finds strong evidence rejecting the unitary model.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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does not require that an income sharing function actually exist.  He assumes that there are
classes of processes that would be equivalent (in their choice outcomes) to what we would
observe from having each individual's consumption decisions made subject to the sharing
function for household income.8
The most direct way to compare Becker's unitary model with the Chiappori collective
model is through the specification of household's objective function.  For Becker, the decision
maker has a preference function that is weakly separable in the consumption choices of each
member of the household.  These separable subfunctions are usually assumed to be the
preference functions of each household member.  Thus, the head of the household "cares" and
this benevolence restricts how the marginal rates of substitution for the consumption of
private goods by different members of the household relate to each other.
In its most basic form, Chiappori's model assumes that adult household members are
not altruistic toward each other.  This assumption, together with the requirement that the
household is efficient, is equivalent to a situation where household choices could be described
as the result of maximizing a strongly separable preference function, that includes the two
partners' preferences.  This formulation allows budget decentralization and explains the
income sharing function as another way of characterizing the implications of strong
separability.
Most descriptions of the collective model include two assumptions.  The first concerns
individual member's preferences for public goods.  The contributions of public goods to
individual well-being are usually assumed to be separable from private goods.9  Second,
applications avoid household production activities.  This strategy arises because the model
does not easily accommodate household production processes that yield a good or service
which is not available on the market.  In cases with household production the income sharing
rule cannot be distinguished from individual preferences or the household production
technology without specific restrictions to the sharing rules or the household production
activities (see Apps and Rees [1997], Chiappori [1997]).  Identification of the income sharing
rule (up to an additive constant) and the recovery of  individual preferences (up to a
translation) relies on the separability of household members' utility functions and the
assumption that there is at least one private good exclusively consumed by each individual.
                                               
8 The sharing rule is a reduced form relationship that can be assumed to be determined within a two stage game.
The first stage determines the relative "weight" of each individual's utility in the household's objective function,
and the second stage resolves consumption and labor supply decisions.
9 Most of the collective models to date considering public goods have done so by including goods that are only
public (i.e., non-rival) within the household, but that can otherwise be purchased in private markets.  Dahlberg
[1997] extends Bergstrom's [1989] results to discuss the relevance of such framework for the median voter
model used to describe the demand for local public goods.  None of these efforts have considered the role of
environmental public goods within the framework.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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Without an exogenous market for H, this addition to the model has the effect of creating non-
separabilities.  That is, including each person's share of H in their respective preference
function (or treating all of H as non-excludable within the household) is equivalent to
introducing a non-separability.  Individual one's utility now depends on the amount of
individual two's resources spent in home production (i.e.,  X h
2 ) and vice versa.  When a
market is assumed to exist for H, it defines an external opportunity cost (i.e., a market price
for H ) that allows the decision process for individual consumption of X
1 and X
2 versus
household production of H to be separated.
To separate preferences from the income sharing rule, once we relax the assumption
that a perfect substitute for H is available in some market, requires adding assumptions about
the structure of that income sharing rule.  One possibility would assume that s(·) is a function
of the total income (wage and non-wage) associated with each member (see Chiappori
[1997]).  Alternatively, other exogenous factors could be assumed to affect the sharing rule
(and not the preference function).  One might assume that s(·) is influenced by the years a
couple has been together or some other demographic characteristic.  Equations (3a) and (3b)
can be re-written as (3a¢) and (3b¢ ) with r designating the exogenous factor:
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If the allocations of X
1 and X
2 to home production can be observed, then it is possible to
distinguish household production from the income sharing rule.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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However, in this case the apparent payment arises because we assume individual one
responds with knowledge of how a change in q, that benefits individual two, will alter his
share of household resources.  Thus, while WTP is not due to his use, it is also not a non-use
value as conventionally defined.  To the extent increases in q enhance the use values for the
commodity consumed by individual two (X
2), it may be possible for that individual to realize
her initial utility level (prior to the exogenous increase in q) with less income.  If individual
two's utility is held at that initial level, we would then expect the amount of household income
allocated to individual one to increase.   s dq q ￿  is then the maximum amount individual one
would be willing to pay for a small change, dq,  in the environmental quality enhancing two's
recreation.  When both members of the household are affected, the problem is more complex
but not impossible to resolve, provided we assume that q is not separable from private goods
in contributing to each member's well being.17
In the case of a non-rival public good (labeled here as Q, to distinguish it from the
exogenous public good) that can be "purchased" by the household, it is possible to identify the
income sharing rule, but all private demands must be assumed to be conditional to the
consumption of the public good (see Browning et al. [1994]).  There are at least two ways of
distinguishing individual preferences from the income sharing rule (aside from separability).
Bergstrom [1989, 1997] proposed the first, requiring that one assume each individual's utility
can be represented as a transferable function.  In this case the household demand for the
public good is invariant to the distribution of income among household members.18  A second
strategy would impose restrictions used in non-market valuation (e.g. weak complementarity
or perfect substitution) to recover the role of Q in each person's preferences by linking it to
private goods consumed by each individual.  In principle these restrictions together with an
                                               
17 It is important to acknowledge that this requirement is the opposite of assumption of separability usually
made in this literature.  The reason for the difference stems from the distinction in the types of public good
involved.  In this case we considered a public good whose level cannot be influenced by the household members,
and our task is to consider whether there is sufficient information to recover how q affects each individual's
preferences.  If we are prepared to assume enough links to observable private goods (i.e., specific types of
nonseparabilities), then it is possible to recover measures of individual preferences for q.
    For the case discussed by Chiappori [1992] Browning et al. [1994], Bergstrom [1989, 1997], and Dahlberg
[1997], the public good is non-rival within the household but purchased at a price through some external
mechanisms.  Their goal was to focus on private goods, so separability assures that demands and relevant income
sharing functions (associated with the private goods) will not be related to the price of the non-rival household
public good.
18 If Q is the non-rival household public good and Mi is the ith person's income or a Hicksian composite good
includes all allocatable goods consumed by both individuals then the relevant transferable utility function is:
U G Q M f Q W i i i = ￿ + ( ) ( , )
where W is a set of demographic variables.  The absence of an i subscript on G(Q) is deliberate.  See Bergstrom
[1989, 1997] for a more detailed discussion.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
14






1 ( , ) ( , ) = -
If we hold individual one's utility constant, we must consider what is happening to the other
household member.  CV1 is a conditional measure that depends on the distribution of income
within the household.  In this case, because individual two does not consume X
1, with s held
constant, changes in P1 will not affect individual two's utility when the distribution of
household income is held constant.  If the commodity was consumed by both individuals, then
the welfare measure would imply the effects of the price change for individual two had not
been taken into account.  This would also be true for changes in an exogenous public good.
A second measure of the compensating variation would allow s(·) to adjust with
changes in P1.  This is defined in equation (19).
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The links between CV1
* and CV1 are analogous to the partial/full CV link discussed by
Hanemann and Morey [1992].  Their Theorem 1 bounds the respective measures (i.e.,
CV CV 1 1 £
*).  There is one further assumption in our case -- individual two's utility level is
held at U
2
.  This conditionality implies we cannot consider re-allocation of well-being
among household members in response to external policy changes.
To understand why, consider a simple example where we plot each household
member's utility with different allocations of household resources in Figure 1.  The objective
function in equation (1) maintains that the analysis begins from an existing distribution of
income that implies the second person is assured U
2 .  U
1 is the point on the Pareto frontier
describing what individual one realizes when two is held at U
2  and allocations of resources
in the household are efficient.  Now suppose there is an exogenous change that enhances the
utilities that can be realized so the new utility possibility frontier for the household
corresponds to the curve labeled II.  Our analysis is based on the premise that U
2  remains
constant.  In fact, for selections on II anywhere between A and B both members of the
household would gain over the initial point.  Unfortunately, we do not know how to describe
which would be selected.  The Chiappori model, as we developed it, holds U
2  at U
2 .  To do
otherwise requires a criteria to select among the points between A and B.
For the most part, benefit estimation for environmental policies gauges the worth of
changes in exogenous variables to the household.  Exogenous public goods, prices, or
probabilities offer applications.  Measurement questions concern whether the changes in public
goods or probabilities are related (through restrictions on preferences or household
technologies) to observable quantities.  If they are related to goods that are allocated within the
household, then the individual members' demand functions must be isolated from household
choices.  This implies the estimates of each individual's values for changes in q or p will
depend on the assumptions used to identify the income sharing rule and to separate eachSmith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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person's demand from the household's aggregate consumption.  If the change is related to a
commodity consumed exclusively by one member of a household, then the model's primary









Figure 1:  Household Utility Possibility Curves for Alternative Policies
G.   General Implications
Adopting a household framework has implications for a wide range of practical
decisions that are often made somewhat arbitrarily with both revealed and stated preference
applications.  Two examples may help to suggest further possibilities.  Many applications of
travel cost demand models are forced to consider cost allocation issues in imputing the "price"
of a recreation trip.  When an individual travels with a group to a recreation site, most analysts
feel allocation of travel costs is warranted for groups that are not households.  When the group
is considered a household then all the cost is attributed to the respondent and there is also an
implicit pooling of household resources into a single income measure.  These distinctions are
included in the data used for demand analysis and could well affect the estimates.  We haveSmith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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little basis for knowing whether they are reasonable.21  Indeed, when group composition has
been studied in random utility models of recreationists' choices of sport fishing sites, it
appears to matter to the description of their decisions.22  To our knowledge, these studies
have not considered how a collective model would influence their cost assignment rules.
A second example involves the standard protocol for constructing a sample with in-
person and telephone surveys.  This procedure can call for:  (a) enumeration of people in a
household (usually but not always those living at a location); (b) identification of adults who
contribute to the rent (or housing costs); and then (c) random selection of one member of that
group for an interview.  The collective model implies we may not be able to estimate
individual benefit measures unless it is possible to collect information that reflects all
members' incomes and factors influencing the income sharing rules.  It is not clear that a
random selection of adults will be the most effective strategy to collect this information.
This has implications for both revealed and stated preference models used to evaluate
environmental policies whose impacts could affect both preferences and income sharing
functions.
Clearly other examples could be provided that identify other areas likely to be affected
by a shift from a unitary to a collective perspective.  Thus, this is not simply a matter of
"layering" additional structure on the description of household preferences.  It is relevant to
the way data are collected.
III.   DISCUSSION
One commentator on the importance of considering the implications of the collective
model for benefit measurement has suggested that there is no role for decomposing benefit
measures "below" the household level because policy is concerned with household resource
commitments.  Under this view it is argued that these resource commitments can be recovered
from household demands without requiring a resolution of the unitary versus collective
decision process.  So there is no need to distinguish individual preferences from group
decisions.  There are at least three reasons why this view does not seem to be correct.  First, at
the most general level we should acknowledge that institutions (or rules) that constrain
individual behavior condition the concept of Pareto efficiency.23  Usually we equate these
institutions with property rights but they could equally be treated as individual "roles" within
a household.  In certain economies, the choice process may not be one that is consistent with
equality of members in the household.  In such societies, a definition of Pareto efficiency
                                               
21 These imputations are analogous to the ones discussed by Randall [1994] in his critical evaluation of a wide
range of judgments inherent in a travel cost model.
22 Kaoru [1995] found in the context of a nested RUM travel cost model that the composition of a group--
whether family, friend or business associates -- affected the length of trip and location for sport fishing.
23 Buchanan [1962] first argued (to our knowledge) that the role of institutions generally (including property
rights) was important to the definition of Pareto optimality.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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focused at the individual level could well yield different benefit measures than one focusing at
the household level.  These differences are especially clear in efforts to apply stated
preference methods in these settings.  Interviews with different members will produce quite
different descriptions of the "household" demand for sanitation and clean water as well as a
wide range of environmental programs.24  These differences should not be treated as
reflections of the "vagaries" of stated preference methods but stem from differences in how
the income shares are established and discretion available to some household members in
comparison to others.
Second, as Quiggin [1998] suggests in a more general context, some of these
differences can arise with the framing of choice questions and the extent of altruism within
the household.  With equal paternalistic altruism whose effects are confined to a non-rival
good or with equal non-paternalistic altruism, the aggregate of each individual members'
willingness to pay (WTP) across the members of the household will equal the household
WTP.  However, either form of individual benevolence can exist, and there still remain
difficulties in measuring individual or household WTP.  In the case of stated preference
questions each requires some characterization of what is done (or will be done) to compensate
or "tax" household members in response to how the proposal policy affects them.25  For
revealed preference methods we will not necessarily recover the same information when we
recognize the differences that arise depending on whose behavior is used to attempt to recover
household demands.
Finally, external constraints can impact different members of the household
differently.  These can be income tax systems, compensation and fringe benefit regimes or
other rules that identify individuals within the household and create opportunities for internal
adjustment and re-allocations (within the household).26  Unless we distinguish each agent and
their interactions with others, we do not have a basis for describing why two segments of a tax
schedule should matter.  The more restrictive assumption of a single preference function and
income pooling by the household focuses attention exclusively on the sum of income.  This
implies quite different types of responses to the tax schedule.
Thus, observed responses to social norms, existing rules and institutions (including tax
and benefit schemes), as well as people's understanding of the reports we request from them will
                                               
24 The valuation research undertaken on water and sanitation projects in developing countries provides clear
examples of these distinctions.  However, it is not limited to this.  Indeed most of the applications of the
collective model have arisen to date in modeling rural agricultural household choices in developing countries.
25 The differences in responses found by Whittington et al. [1992] to allowing households time to consider a
choice could reflect recognition of other members' constraints.
26 One explanation for what was described as excessive estimates of the aggregate WTP in Australia to avoid
development of a gold mine near the Kakadu National Preserve was the effect of the tax law on how respondents
may have answered CV question.  See Carson et al. [1994] for a summary of the study.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
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be interpreted differently with the orientation implied by the collective model.  It is an empirical
question as to whether the benefit measures will be greatly impacted by the distinctions.
IV.   TESTING THE COLLECTIVE MODEL
It seems unlikely that a collective view of household choice would dramatically
change the estimates of benefits derived from improvements in all environmental resources.
As with some types of evaluations of individual of the labor/leisure choice the refinement
may not always be important.  However, for some problems--understanding women's labor
supply choices with and without children present or household choices to reduce collective
risks such as morbidity effects to parents and children, or the choices of infertility or birth
defects, the effects may be large.
Under ideal circumstances, information would be collected from both partners in a
household in order to evaluate which factors influence whether a collective view of household
choice matters.   This would parallel the approach taken by Kooreman and Kapteyn [1987]
but would include information on other budgetary choices related to avoiding environmental
harms or seeking environmental quality.  Thus, one could envision analysis of single agent
recreation demand models versus collective model specifications and tests of the cost
allocation and income sharing conditions that would distinguish collective from individual
choice.  This could be extended to matched stated preference interviews with and without
opportunities for coordination.  The Roback [1982]-Rosen[1979] formulation of the hedonic
model and implicit valuation of site amenities could be reconsidered with two wage models
reflecting cases where the housing decision and the decisions for both jobs were changed
simultaneously.  Ideally this analysis would focus on dual earner households making these
types of choices.
Of course, any one of these projects would be a large enterprise.  Testing can proceed
on a more limited scale by collecting information from individuals about household
circumstances and the decisions that are likely to be related to the behavior, such as the
labor/leisure choices of both members.  Recovery of the income sharing function does not
require knowledge of all the activities of the household and its members.  It does require some
information on both members.  Thus, limited tests can proceed by reconsidering the
information that is available.  A major stumbling block that may affect some of these efforts
(based on a non-systematic review of the data resources available to us) is the failure to
decompose household income and to collect disaggregate information in ways that would
allow estimation of household members' wage rates.
A recent pilot study investigating how the collective model influences individual and
household demands for interventions that would reduce infertility risk (see Smith and
Van Houtven [1998b]) suggests that even with individual responses it is possible to test some of
the implications of the model provided we can successfully isolate the incomes of each member.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
19
REFERENCES
Apps, P.F. and R. Rees.  1996.  "Labor Supply, Household Production and Intra-Family Welfare
Distribution."  Journal of Public Economics  60(May): 199-220.
Apps, P.F. and R. Rees.  1997.  "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production."  Journal of
Political Economy  105(February): 178-190.
Becker, Gary S.  1974.  "A Theory of Social Interactions."  Journal of Political Economy 82(December):
1063-1094.
Becker, Gary S.  1981.  A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Bergstrom, Theodore C.  1989.  "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household
Mysteries."  Journal of Political Economy  97(October): 1138-1159.
Bergstrom, Theodore C. 1997. "A Survey of Theories of the Family." In M. R. Rosenweig and Oded
Stark, editors, Handbook of Population and Family Economics, Vol 1A (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Blackorby, Charles, David Primont, and Robert R. Russell.  1978.  Duality, Separability and
Functional Separability: Theory and Economic Applications  (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Bockstael, Nancy B. and Kenneth E. McConnell.  1993.  "Public Goods in Characteristics of Non-
Market Commodities."  Economic Journal 103(3): 1244-1257.
Browning, Martin, F. Bourguignon, Pierre-Andrè Chiappori, and V.L. Techene.  1994.  "Income and
Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation."  Journal of Political Economy
102(December): 1067-1096.
Browning, Martin and Pierre-Andrè Chiappori.  1994.  "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A
General Characterization and Empirical Tests," unpublished paper, McMaster University, May.
Buchanan, James M.  1962.  "The Relevance of Pareto Optimality."  Journal of Conflict Resolution
6(December): 341-354.
Carson, Richard T., Leanne Wilks, and David Imber.  1994.  "Valuing the Preservation of Australia's
Kakadu Conservation Zone."  Oxford Economic Papers 46(October): 727-749.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andrè.  1988.  "Rational Household Labor Supply."  Econometrica 56(January): 63-89.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andrè.  1992.  "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare."  Journal of Political
Economy 100(June): 437-467.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andrè.  1997.  "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor
Supply."  Journal of Political Economy 105(February): 191-209.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
20
Dahlberg, M.  1997.  "Household Preferences and the Demand for Local Public Goods."
Essay V, Essays on Estimation Methods and Local Public Economics.  Economic Studies
31, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
Diewart, W. Erwin.  1977.  "Generalized Slutsky Conditions for Aggregate Consumer Demand
Functions."  Journal of Economic Theory 15(August): 353-362.
Gorman, W.M.  1970.  "Quasi-Separability," unpublished paper, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Gorman, W.M.  1971.  "Two Stage Budgeting," unpublished paper, London School of Economics
and Political Science.
Graham, Daniel.  1981.  "Cost Benefit Analysis Under Uncertainty."  American Economic Review
71(September): 715-725.
Graham, Daniel.  1992.  "Public Expenditure Under Uncertainty: The Net Benefits Criteria."
American Economic Review 82(5): 882-946.
Hamilton, James T.  1998.  Channeling Violence: The Economic Market for Violent Television
Programming (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
Hanemann, W. Michael and Edward Morey.  1992.  "Separability, Partial Demand Systems, and
Consumer's Surplus Measures."  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
22(May): 241-258.
Hausman, Jerry A.  1981.  "Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss."  American Economic
Review 71(September): 662-676.
Hotz, V. Joseph, Jacob Alex Klerman, and Robert J. Willis.  1997.  "The Economics of Fertility in
Developing Countries," in M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark, Handbook of Population and Family
Economics Vol. 1A (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Kaoru, Yoshiaki.  1995.  "Measuring Marine Recreation Benefits of Water Quality Improvements by
the Nested Random Utility Model."  Resource and Energy Economics 17(2): 119-136.
Kooreman, Peter and Arie Kapteyn.  1987.  "A Disaggregated Analysis of the Allocation of Time
Within the Household."  Journal of Political Economy 95(April): 223-249.
Lillard, Lee A. and Yoram Weiss.  1997.  "Uncertain Health and Survival: Effects on End-of-Life
Consumption," Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15(April): 254-268.
Lundberg, Shelly J. and Robert A. Pollak.  1993.  "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage
Market."  Journal of Political Economy 1(December): 988-1010.
Lundberg, Shelly J. and Robert A. Pollak.  1996.  "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage."  Journal
of Economic Perspectives 10(Fall): 139-158.Smith and Van Houtven RFF 98-31
21
Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terance J. Wales.  1997.  "Do Households and Wives Pool
Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit."  Journal of Human
Resources 32(3): 463-480.
Manser, Marilyn and M. Brown.  1980.  "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining
Analysis."  International Economic Review 21(February): 31-44.
McElroy, Marjorie B. 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior."
Journal of Human Resources 25(4): 559-583.
McElroy, Marjorie B. and M.J. Horney.  1981.  "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions." International
Economic Review 22(2): 333-350.
Quiggin, John.  1998.  "Individual and Household Willingness to Pay for Public Goods."  American
Journal of Agricultural Economics (in press).
Randall, Alan.  1994.  "A Difficulty With the Travel Cost Method."  Land Economics 70(February):
88-96.
Roback, Jennifer.  1982.  "Wages, Rents and Quality of Life."  Journal of Political Economy
90(December):  1257-1278.
Rosen, Sherwin.  1979.  "Wage Based Indexes of Urban Quality of Life" in P. Mieszkowski and M.
Straszheim, Current Issues in Urban Economics (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins).
Samuelson, Paul A.  1956.  "Social Indifference Curves."  Quarterly Journal of Economics
70(February): 1-22.
Smith, V. Kerry.  1987.  "Nonuse Values in Benefit Cost Analysis." Southern Economic Journal
54(July): 19-26.
Smith, V. Kerry.  1991.  "Household Production Functions and Environmental Benefit Estimation" in
J.B. Braden and C.D. Kolstad, Measuring the Demand for Environmental Quality (Amsterdam:
North Holland).
Smith, V. Kerry and George Van Houtven.  1998a.  "Is Altruism All That Distinguishes Individual and
Household WTP?"  Unpublished paper under revision, Center for Environmental and Resource
Economics, Duke University, April.
Smith, V. Kerry and George Van Houtven.  1998b.  "Infertility Risk and Household Behavior."
Unpublished paper under revision, Center for Environmental and Resource Economics, Duke
University, April.
Whittington, Dale, V. Kerry Smith, Afia Okorafor, Augustine Okore, Jin Long Liu, and Alexander
McPhail.  1992.  "Giving Respondents Time to Think in Contingent Valuation Studies:  A
Developing Country Application."  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
22(May):  205-225.